

CHAPTER 1

AN INTRODUCTION

1.1. Background

The timeline of [human evolution](#) occurred around 7 million years ago, from the separation of the [Pan](#) genus until the emergence of [behavioral modernity](#) by 50,000 years ago, of this timeline; the first 3 million years concern [Sahelanthropus](#),¹ the following 2 million concern [Australopithecus](#),² while the final 2 million span the history of actual [human](#) species ‘the [Paleolithic](#)’. The way of human thought is heavily influenced by the progress of philosophy and psychology science. The history of philosophy and psychology as the early foundation in the enhancing of human brain and mind construction, both are closely related to the history of content and consciousness, human behavior, reason, perception, and action.

¹ *Sahelanthropus tchadensis* is an extinct hominine species that is dated to about 7 million years ago, possibly very close to the time of the chimpanzee/human divergence and so it is unclear whether it can be regarded as a member of the Hominini tribe. See, Arthur Klages, “Sahelanthropus tchadensis: An Examination of its Hominin Affinities and Possible Phylogenetic Placement”. *The University of Western Ontario Journal of Anthropology*. Vol. 16, 2008, 32.

² *Australopithecus* from Latin *australis* ‘southern’, Greek *πίθηκος* *pithekos* (*ape*) is an extinct genus of hominids. From the evidence gathered by palaeontologists and archaeologists, it appears that the *Australopithecus* genus evolved in eastern Africa around 4 million years ago before spreading throughout the continent and eventually becoming extinct 2 million years ago. During this time period a number of australopith species emerged, including *Australopithecus afarensis*, *A. africanus*, *A. anamensis*, *A. bahrelghazali*, *A. garhi* and *A. sediba*. Academics still debate whether certain African hominid species of this time, such as *A. robustus* and *A. boisei*, constitute members of the same genus. If so, they would be considered robust australopiths whilst the others would be gracile australopiths. However, if these species do constitute their own genus, they may be given their own name, *Paranthropus*. Archaeologists and palaeontologists widely hold that the australopiths played a significant part in human evolution, being the first of the hominins to show presence of a gene that causes increased length and ability of neurons in the brain, the duplicated *SRGAP2* gene. See, Sara Reardon, “The humanity switch: How one gene made us brainier” *New Scientist*, 03 May 2012, (<http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn21777-the-humanity-switch-how-one-gene-made-us-brainier.html>, accessed on December, 26 2013)

Around the end of the 5th century BC, the Pythagoreans came up with the idea of a soul as something resident in the body but capable of existence apart from it. Plato developed this concept further. Traces of Plato's work have become part of the psychology of Leibnitz, Freud, and others. Aristotle also worked from the hypothesis that the body has what he called as a *pneuma*, animus or spirit, though he was unclear *as its form*.

He appears to have believed that it moved. Aristotle also proposed that the soul is defined as the perfection of unity toward which the functions of the body are directed. whatever its relation to the physical body it is generally agreed that mind is that which enables as a being to have [subjective awareness](#) and [intentionality](#) towards their environment, to [perceive](#) and respond to [stimuli](#) with some kind of [agency](#) and to have consciousness, including thinking and [feeling](#).

Thus, Parmenides stated that, "Thinking and the thought that it is are the same, for you will not find thinking apart from *what is*, in relation to which it is uttered." he means, that everything can be affecting the human consciousness that comes from the soul and human body, such as empathy, rituals, symbols and tools; will greatly helpful in the development of the human consciousness discourse.

Another science that has much influence in the human outlook—about content and consciousness—on the universe is astronomy and geography. During the 6th century BC, Pythagoras proposed the notion of a spherical earth and the universe populated by objects whose motions were governed by natural laws. During the 2nd century AD, Ptolemaeus proposed a geocentric universe. The geocentric theory reached its pinnacle at circa 450 AD, with the system called the 'Geocentric Model',³ continued to be the system of choice as the Roman Empire succeeded that of the Greeks.

³ In [astronomy](#), the geocentric model (also known as geocentrism, or the Ptolemaic system), is a description of the [cosmos](#) where [Earth](#) is at the orbital center of all celestial bodies. This model served as the predominant cosmological system in many ancient civilizations such as [ancient Greece](#). As such, they assumed that the [Sun](#),

Then becomes the beginning replacement of geocentrism to heliocentrism caused a lot of opposition from the Catholic Church, because the idea of a geocentric system corresponds with the dogma that earth is the center of Creation, while the concept of a heliocentric system does not. This concept dominated astronomical thought for some 1,300 years ago, until Copernicus assigned the central position in the solar system to the sun, called the 'heliocentric system'.

This 'victory' of science is considered to be a significant step in the evolution of human thought, because it symbolizes the change from dogma to observation and thought. In the modern era, the development of science— was influenced in the human outlook— proceed by several scientist, such as Kepler and Newton proceeded to formulate the natural laws that govern planetary movement, while Galileo introduced the use of the telescope to astronomical observation.

Similar developments have been made in physics, chemistry and psychology. The ancient concept of the four elements on several religions—earth, water, air and fire—and the misconceptions of medieval alchemy—such as the notion that lead can be converted into gold via chemical reaction—have dominated many aspects of physics for over two thousand years. Thus, during the 17th century, Robert Boyle (1627-1691) formulated the concept of 'chemical element' for a century later.⁴

[Moon, stars](#) and [naked eye planets](#) circled Earth, including the noteworthy systems of [Aristotle](#) (see [Aristotelian physics](#)) and [Ptolemy](#). See, Russell M. Lawson, *Science in the Ancient World: An Encyclopedia* (California: ABC-CLIO, Inc, 2004), [29-30](#).

⁴ Robert Boyle defined an element as a substance that cannot be broken down into simpler materials. He cast doubt on the Greek elements and provided a criterion for showing that a material was not an element. Many elements were discovered during the next 100 years, but progress was delayed by the phlogiston hypothesis. According to this hypothesis, when a substance was burned it lost a substance called phlogiston to the air. Near the end of the eighteenth century, this hypothesis was finally discredited, allowing the French chemist Antoine Lavoisier in 1789 to draw up a list of elements then known. This list included 22 materials which are still recognized as elements today, but also included heat and light, as well as other materials now known not to be elements such as lime, magnesia, barytes, alumina and silica. He was doubtful about some of the "elements"

After publishing the special theory of relativity in 1905, Einstein started thinking about, *how* to incorporate gravity into his new relativistic framework. In 1907, he beginning with a simple thought experiment involving an observer in ‘free fall matter’, he embarked on what will be an eight-year search for a relativistic theory of gravity. After numerous detours and false starts, his work culminated in the presentation to the Prussian Academy of Science in November 1915, called the ‘Einstein Field Equations’. These equations specify *how* the geometry of space and time is influenced by matter and radiations are present, and form the core of ‘Einstein’s General Theory of Relativity’. Appalled by the political development that led to the first and later the Second World War, Einstein exchanged correspondence with Freud on the nature of Man. With Tagore, he discussed the nature of truth and mysticism.

Carl Gustav Jung, who worked with Freud between 1907 and 1912, had many concepts those are prominent in the New Age community; this led him to develop the theory that came from an area of the mind experiences, he called the ‘collective unconscious’, which he held was shared by everyone. Carl Gustav Jung said:

“My thesis thus is, as follows: in addition to our immediate consciousness, which is of a thoroughly personal nature and which we believe to be the only empirical, there exists a second psychic system of a collective, universal, and impersonal nature which is identical in all individuals. This collective unconscious does not develop individually but is inherited. It consists of pre-existent forms, the archetypes, which can only become conscious secondarily and which give definite form to *certain* psychic contents.”⁵

on his list, he stated that “These things, which we at present suppose to be simple, may soon turn out to be otherwise,” His list did not include caustic soda and potash, even though they had not been decomposed at that time, because he felt that these materials were very likely to be broken down in the future. See, Robert Boyle, *The History of The Concept of Element*, with particular reference to Humphry Davy, (http://chemistry.sls.ie/resources/downloads/ch_cw_davyelements.pdf., accessed on January, 01 2014)

⁵ Carl Gustav Jung, *The Archetypes and the Collective Unconscious* (London: Princeton University Press, 1996), 43.

Carl Gustav Jung also studied the relation between religion and psychology. He conceived that the Christian religion was part of a historic *process* necessary for the development of consciousness. He was also impressed with his finding that alchemy like symbols can often be found in modern dreams and fantasies, and that the drawings created by psychiatric patients were often dominated by patterns arranged in circles, or occasionally crosses or squares and that these drawings bore a striking resemblance to religious symbols as such *mandala's*⁶—good examples are the *mandala's* found in Tibetan Buddhist monasteries⁷—as used in many different cultures.

The development also have been made on modern history of science in reality and probability discourse, particularly in quantum mechanics; it was influenced the human view on *reality* even more. In 1704, Isaac Newton described the light as a stream of particles. Christian Huygens thought the light as a wave. It was clear to anyone that the two views were mutually exclusive. However, when Thomas Young performed his famous double slit experiment in 1801, it became clear that light behaved as a wave, and late in the 19th century the photo-electric effect was discovered, clearly proving that light behaves as particles. Researchers were forced to accept that light can in fact have two apparently mutually exclusive properties, a notion that still seems against the common sense.

⁶“The mandala serves a conservative purpose—namely, to restore a previously existing order. But it also serves the *creative purpose* of giving expression and form to something that does not yet exist, something new and unique...The process is that of the ascending spiral, which grows upward while simultaneously returning again and again to the same point. See, Carl Gustav Jung, *Man and His Symbols* (New York: Dell Publishing, 1964), 225.

⁷ According to Buddhist scripture, sand mandalas *transmit* positive energies to the environment and to the people who view them. While constructing a mandala, Buddhist monks chant and meditate to invoke the divine energies of the deities residing within the mandala. The monks then ask for the deities' healing blessings. A mandala's healing power extends to the whole world even before it is swept up and dispersed into flowing water—a further expression of sharing the mandala's blessings with all. See, “How Mandalas Heal” *Tibetan Healing Mandala*, (<https://www.asia.si.edu/exhibitions/online/mandala/mandala.htm>, accessed on December, 26 2013)

Heisenberg proposed his 'Uncertainty Principle'—it is sometimes called the 'Heisenberg Principle'—in the 1927, upon which he built his philosophy and for which he is best known. Heisenberg was awarded the *Nobel Prize in Physics for 1932* 'for the creation of quantum mechanics, This source explains that Heisenberg actually received his Nobel Prize for 1932, one year later, in 1933. Stating that the *observation* of phenomenon influences those are as same phenomenon, which leads to the conclusion that some phenomenon *cannot be observed* without disturbing them up to the point of invalidating the observation.

Erwin Schrödinger proceeded to reduce the matter and the spacial characteristics to a collection of probabilities. He devised equations to calculate the characteristics of matter—and inherently of everything else—in terms of probability. Schrödinger take the logical conclusion in his famous thought experiment that is now called 'Schrödinger's Cat', which was intended to show that what we think of as reality might also be thought of as a complex wave *functions* or *probabilities*. Schrödinger, who was very much at home in both philosophy and literature, published his *Nature and the Greeks* in 1954, in which he not only expressed his admiration for the Greek scientific view of the world, but also his skepticism toward the relevance of science as a unique tool with which to unravel *the ultimate mysteries* of human existence. His last publication in 1961 closely paralleled the mysticism of the Vedanta.

There are many different framework in human thought studies, which gives a different *color* to each studies, according to the viewpoint and its emphasis of human thought studies. The generalization of content and consciousness understanding are includes all mental faculties, thought, [volition](#), feeling and memory; gradually develops over the 14th and 15th centuries. The functions of the human consciousness have received much attention from modern psychology. The British and German traditions of psychology

were based on the *phenomenological approach*, which includes the description of immediate experiences, directly it comes to the observing person. It tends to regard mind separate from the body and to get along with only minor reference to physiology. Meanwhile, the French and American traditions became *primarily mechanistic*—starting with Descartes during the 17th century—holding that mind and body are an extension of each other (interrelated), so that mind affects body and body affects mind.⁸

The Interdependence between subject and object is one of the keys to understanding content and consciousness. The ‘meta’ world can be perceived by the mind, and so also is the interior world of *conscious events*. The relation between two discourses are much debated, “We consciously experience many different things, and we can think about the things that we are experience it. But it is not easy to think about content and consciousness itself. Does the world have *an observer-independent existence* (realism) or does its existence depend in some way on the operation of *our own minds* (idealism)? is knowledge of the world ‘public’ and ‘objective’, and knowledge of our own experience ‘private’ and ‘subjective’?,”⁹ “It has been assumed that our cognition must conform to the objects; but all attempts to ascertain anything about these objects *a priori*, by means of the conceptions and to extend the range of our knowledge, have been rendered abortive by this assumption.”¹⁰ Some thinkers maintain, that subject and object are *only different aspects* of

⁸ See, Oxford American College Dictionary, ‘Mind’: “The element of a person that enables them to be aware of the world and their experiences, to think and to feel, the faculty of consciousness and thought.”

⁹ Max Velmans, [Understanding Consciousness](#) (London: Routledge, 2000), 3.

¹⁰ Let us thus make the experiment whether we may not be more successful in metaphysics, if we assume that the objects must conform to our cognition. This appears, at all events, to accord better with the possibility of our gaining the end we have in view, that is to say, of arriving at the cognition of objects a priori, of determining something with respect to these objects, before they are given to us. We here propose to do just what Copernicus did in attempting to explain the celestial movements. When he found that he can make no progress by assuming that all the heavenly bodies revolved round the spectator, he reversed the process and tried the experiment of assuming that the spectator revolved, while the stars remained at rest. We may make the same experiment with regard to the intuition of objects.” See, an on-line translation is found at Immanuel Kant, [Critique of Pure](#)

experience. We can experience ourselves as subject, and in the act of self-reflection, we objectify ourselves. The fallacy of this argument is obvious, being a subject implies having an object. We cannot experience something consciously without the mediation of mind understanding. Our experience is already conceptualized at the time it comes into our consciousness. Our experience is negative, insofar as it destroys the original pure immediacy. In a dialectical process of synthesis, the original immediate experience becomes an *object for us*. The common state of our mind is only capable of realizing the object. The object is negative experience, by objectification of ourselves we do not dispense with the subject; but the subject is causally and apodeictically linked to the object, as soon as we make an object of anything, we have to realize which objectifies something. It is only the subject who can do that. *Without the subject there are no objects and without objects there is no subject*. This interdependence is not to be understood in terms of a dualism, so that the object and the subject are real independent substances.



[Reason](#), Philosophy on the Server, Iowa State University (eserver.org). This and other web resources for Immanuel Kant are posted by Stephen Palmquist, Hong Kong Baptist University, Religion and Philosophy, (<https://hkbu.academia.edu/StephenPalmquist>, accessed on December, 26 2013)

1.2. Problems of Research

1.2.1. Identification of Problem

Descartes 'Dualism', Dennett's 'Cartesian Theater' and eliminativism are the essential problem to be identified in the thesis. Because dualism and eliminativism are two historically important philosophical approaches to the reconciliation problem—firmly in content and consciousness studies—because both of these approaches suggest that the *problem cannot be solved*—mind and body problem—by science. Rene Descartes argued that the scientific image cannot be applied to the mind. We have seen that the mind, as portrayed in the manifest image, seems radically different from the nervous system, or indeed any physical system; in Descartes' Framework concluded that the mind must not be a physical system.

This reason called 'Cartesian Dualism'. Although this view is most closely associated with Descartes, there has been something of a contemporary revival. For example, David Chalmers has recently argued, in an influential book, that *consciousness cannot be a physical property of the brain*.¹¹ Four varieties of dualism, the arrows indicate the direction of the causal interactions.¹²

But, the materialist (or physicalist) tells about an alternative to dualism gets around this problem by positing that conscious states may not be distinct from physical states after all. The effect of our mental states on our behaviour is therefore no longer problematic, because both are part of the *physical world*.

¹¹ See, David John Chalmers, *The Conscious Mind* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 43.

¹² See, E.R. After Valentine, 1982 and [Wikipedia](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophy_of_mind). (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophy_of_mind) see also, "Philosophical Positions on Consciousness" *What is Consciousness?*, (http://thebrain.mcgill.ca/flash/a/a_12/a_12_p/a_12_p_con/a_12_p_con.html, accessed on December, 26 2013)

For philosophers such as Paul and Patricia Churchland, two of the main proponents of eliminative materialism, argued that no one is conscious in the phenomenal sense—the sense of the “hard problem” of consciousness formulated by Chalmers. Instead, all problems can be reduced to the “easy” problems that may eventually be solved without recourse to physical properties other than those that we already know. In short, philosophers like the Churchlands believe that psychological explanations of our mental states are *only* temporary *stopgaps* that will one day be replaced by *new neurobiological models*. Faced with arguments such as those of Jackson and his vision specialist who has never seen a colour, the eliminative materialists get around them by saying that one can speak of conscious states in *two ways*: as being conscious, and as being physical.

It is not a matter of *two different properties*, but rather of *a single property* that can be discussed in *two different ways*. It is somewhat like discussing an actor’s role in a particular movie: you can talk about him using the name of the character he plays, or using his name in real life, but either way, you are talking about the same person, the same reality. Thus the eliminative materialists would say that Jackson’s vision specialist who is experiencing the colour red for the first time is basically just experiencing a new way of talking about the *same reality*.¹³

All of the positions discussed so far accept the existence of “mental states”, “physical state”, meaning desires, beliefs, intentions, etc., at the origin of our behaviours. But the “eliminative” version of materialism states that these popular concepts are quite simply false, even if they seem to have *real* explanatory power.

The way that eliminative materialists see things, just as the setting of the Sun is an illusion that can be explained by the Earth’s rotation on its axis, so conscious mental states

¹³ See original text, “Philosophical Positions on Consciousness” *What is Consciousness?*, (http://thebrain.mcgill.ca/flash/a/a_12/a_12_p/a_12_p_con/a_12_p_con.html, accessed on December, 26 2013)

are only an *illusion* that will eventually be dispelled by progress in the neurosciences. That is why this form of materialism is called “eliminative”: it quite simply eliminates the concept that is causing the problem, i.e., *mental states*.

Some contemporary philosophers advocate the other extreme. They agree with Descartes that the *reconciliation problem cannot be solved*, but instead of rejecting the application of the scientific image to the mind, they only rejecting the manifest image. Despite appearances, human beings are not really conscious, thinking, free, responsible agents. This view is called ‘Eliminative Materialism’.^{14 15}

Dualism is implausible for several reasons, is the causal closure of the physical universe. It is a *fundamental assumption* of contemporary science that every physical event, everything that happens in the physical world, has a *physical cause*. There is no doubt that much human behavior consists of physical events, e.g.: the motion of a body, it follows that if the mind is not physical thus either states of mind do not cause human behavior, or human behavior is causally over-determined.

The view that states of mind *do not cause* human behavior is called ‘Epiphenomenonism’. Is a mind-body philosophy marked by the belief that basic physical events (sense organs, neural impulses and muscle contractions) are causal with respect to mental events (thought, consciousness and cognition). Mental events are viewed as

¹⁴ Also called eliminativism, is a materialist position in the philosophy of mind? Its primary claim that people’s common-sense understanding of the mind—or folk psychology—is *false* and that certain classes of mental states, that most people believe in do not exist. Some eliminativists argue that no coherent neural basis will be found for many everyday psychological concepts such as belief or desire, since they are poorly defined. Rather, they argue that psychological concepts of behavior and experience shall be judged by how well they reduce to the biological level. See, William G. Lycan and George J. Pappas, “What is eliminative materialism?”. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*. Vol. 50, 1972, 149-159.

¹⁵ Other versions entail the non-existence of conscious mental states such as pain and visual perceptions (because it advocates the elimination of the manifest image. Very few eliminativists advocate the elimination of every part of the manifest image). See, Georges Rey, “A Reason for Doubting the Existence of Consciousness”. in R. Davidson, et. al, *Consciousness and Self-Regulation*. Vol. 3, 1983, 1-39.

completely dependent on physical functions, thus, have no independent existence or *causal efficacy*; it is a mere appearance. Fear seems to make the heart beat faster; though according to epiphenomenalism, the state of the nervous system causes the heart to beat faster.¹⁶ Because mental events are a kind of overflow that cannot cause anything physical, epiphenomenalism is viewed as a version of monism¹⁷—but it is no less very implausible—because our emotions, thoughts and sensations us to do things.¹⁸

Eliminativism is implausible too, it have sophisticated responses to this sort of objection. However, it *reminds controversial* whether these responses work. It is seems obvious that human beings are conscious, thinking, free, responsible agents. These are fundamental assumptions on which the most important human institutions depend. Indeed, it is hard to see *how* to understand science itself without assuming that scientists are conscious, thinking, free, responsible agents. Let us make a few simple questions, when a scientist defends a theory, are they not expressing and defending something they think is *true*? Are they not responsible for the theory and the arguments they construct is *good*? One common complaint about eliminativism is that it cannot be expressed and defended without presupposing what it denies. If someone claims that humans do not really have *thoughts*, is it not the case that they think that humans do not really have thoughts? Eliminativism does not just undermine fundamental assumptions on which the most important human institutions depend; it risks *undermining* itself as well.

¹⁶ See, Sven Walter, “Epiphenomenalism” *Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, (<http://www.unibielefeld.de/philosophie/personen/walter/>, accessed on December, 26 2013)

¹⁷ D. Brett King, et. al, *A History of Psychology: Ideas and Context*, (New Jersey: Pearson Education Inc., 2009), 30-37.

¹⁸ Note: the alternative is that human behavior often has two sets of causes: physical/neural causes and parallel non-physical/mental causes. But this kind of causal over-determination is very puzzling. *What work is left for the mind to do if everything a human body?* Dualists have sophisticated responses to these sorts of objections. However, it reminds controversial whether these responses work.

1.2.2. Limitation of Problem

When Haldane said that, “The universe is *not only* stranger than we imagine, it is *even stranger than* we can imagine,” he has at least half right. If our imagination is *limited* by our ability to observe, we can never learn all about the universe. But if we strive to stretch our means of observation to fit the limits of our imagination, we can do. In other words: only if we believe that there is something to see, do we *start looking*?

Some aspects of the universe and the phenomena may be beyond the limits of our observations. Our *presence* also influences the structure of space and our observations influence the phenomena observed; so we must accept the fact that we are a product of the universe, but also that the nature of universe is at least in part a product of our presence. That does not necessarily mean that we cannot learn about it. We shall have to accept the fact that there are phenomena and aspects of reality that cannot be observed by conventional means, that hypotheses and theories cannot be proved *or* disproved so.

Regarding to the statement before, the thesis is focusing on the discussion of content and consciousness on which essentially cannot be separated each other. But, to make it clear and systematically, the author makes such a limitation of problem and theory to the topic is taken a part of Daniel C. Dennett’s book entitled *Intuition Pumps and Other Tools for Thinking*. About the contemporary concept of human thought, regarding to the concept of ‘Darwin Evolution’ and some philosopher are closely related to *content* and *consciousness* by Dennett’s framework.

1.2.3. Formulation of Problem

The history of science is extremely long and complex, and many scientists have been right, spectacularly wrong, or just clueless. The common factors are easily summarized:

1. How to explain *content* and *consciousness* by Dennett's thought and some philosopher notable ideas?
2. How to apply Dennett's thought and some philosopher notable ideas in *content* and *consciousness*?

1.3. Purpose of Research

The purpose of the thesis is to explain the statement that have been formulated before about the topic, which are as follows:

1. Understanding of *content* and *consciousness* by Dennett's thought and some philosopher notable ideas.
2. Offering the application in Dennett's thought and some philosopher notable ideas in *content* and *consciousness*.

1.4. Summary of Contribution

The contribution that might be achieved to the all readers from the thesis are as follows:

1. Expected to understanding of *content* and *consciousness* by Dennett's thought.
2. Expected to give an other ideas, framework and an application of *content* and *consciousness*, particularly in contemporary Indonesian philosophy studies.

1.5 Literature Review

Daniel Dennett¹⁹—philosopher of mind, critic of religion, public defender (and, more importantly, dedicated deployer) of Darwinism, developer and distributor of “dangerous” ideas —has even played his own double in print and on the screen: in a mind-bending parable called “Where Am I?” (1978) and in an *odd* film partly based on this parable called *Victim of the Brain* (1988), he said:

Would I submit to a surgical procedure that would completely *remove* my brain, which would then be placed in a life-support system at the Manned Spacecraft Center in Houston? Each input and output pathway, as it was severed, would be restored by a pair of microminiaturized radio transceivers, one attached precisely to the brain, the other to the nerve stumps in the empty cranium. No information would be lost, all the connectivity would be preserved. At first I was a bit reluctant.²⁰

And this “doubling” of Dennett is not the least of it! “Yes, we have a soul,” Dennett proclaims, “but it’s made of lots of tiny robots.”²¹ Although he is clearly a connoisseur of colorful metaphors, philosophical puzzles and fantastic thought experiments, Dennett is one of our most *serious* and influential philosophers of mind. His work is widely cited among academic philosophers and cognitive scientists, but at the same time he conscientiously makes that work accessible to *general* readers.

¹⁹ See original text by Glen Worthey, “Daniel C. Dennett, The Evolution of “Why” *Humanities Digital Information Service Stanford University Libraries & Academic Information Resources 2009*, (<http://prelectur.stanford.edu/lecturers/dennett/>, accessed on January, 13 2014)

²⁰ “Where Am I?,” published in Daniel Clement Dennett, *Brainstorms: Philosophical Essays on Mind and Psychology*, and in Douglas Hofstadter and Daniel Clement Dennett, *The Mind’s I*, from which this quote is taken, 218. The film *Victim of the Brain*, directed by Piet Hoenderdos in 1988, is available in a low-resolution version on Google Video.

²¹ See, Daniel Clement Dennett, *Freedom Evolves* (New York: Viking Press, 2003), 1 and *Breaking the Spell: Religion as a Natural Phenomenon* (London: Penguin Group, 2006), 302. As Dennett explains in a note to this latter appearance, “This was the headline, in Italian, of an interview with me by Giulio Giorelli published in *Corriere della Sera* in Milan in 1997. Ever since then, he has adopted it as his slogan, opening his book *Freedom Evolves*, (New York: Viking Press, 2003) and *Breaking the Spell: Religion as a Natural Phenomenon* (London: Penguin Group, 2006), 408n.

Dennett's wide-ranging books really all center on one thing: *the human mind*, whether it goes by the name of "consciousness," "cognition," or even "soul." Even the "lots of tiny robots" in Dennett's materialist definition of the soul (quoted before) may sound like the same sort of jocular science fiction as the disembodied brain in "Where Am I?" but in fact the idea refers explicitly to his very serious "Multiple Drafts Model" of consciousness—in which there is no single point of cognition—no single line of demarcation between the unconscious and the conscious, and no single "self" even to "be" conscious. Although it was not developed in a vacuum, and although it has remained far from uncontroversial since he elaborated it in 1991, this stunning model of what goes on in the human cranium reminds one of Dennett's *profoundest* contributions to the contemporary philosophy of mind.

Whether he approaches the mind through philosophy—strictly understood—as an academic discipline, cognitive science (a field to which he is an avid contributor), or biology (notably is Darwinian evolution), Dennett has always been less interested in abstract concepts about the universe or any universal "truths" the universe may embody than in the mechanics and origins of the human mind itself. Even his most recent foray into the study of religion—a field not necessarily outside his base of philosophy—is really a study of religion as it exists in human mind(s), of religion as an *artifact* of human evolution, of "Religion as a Natural Phenomenon". Thus, Dennett added:

So while it is something of an oversimplification of his remarkable work, it is not at all incorrect to summarize Dennett's principal topic as "philosophy of mind." He himself, in numerous contexts and from the very beginning of his career, has divided this topic into *two main sub-topics*: "content" and "consciousness." Not only is this the very title of his first book; he also begins an illuminating 1994 essay, "Self-Portrait," with the assertion that not only have these two sub-topics defined his career, but they have done so in precisely the same order (with some recapitulation over the years) in which he presents them, "that is, the order in which they must be addressed: *first*, a theory of content or *intentionality*—a phenomenon

more fundamental than consciousness—and *then*, building on that foundation, a theory of *consciousness*.”²²

Dennett calls his particular ordering of *content* and *consciousness* a “renegade” one among philosophers, who traditionally consider *consciousness* as the fundamental phenomenon on which *content* depends. (Put another way, philosophers unquestioningly follow Descartes’ order, *cogito*—“I am conscious”—*ergo sum*—“therefore I have content,” rather than Dennett’s opposite ordering.²³) Some may see this difference as superficial or inconsequential. But Dennett—and, in his telling, the entire field of academic philosophy—clearly does not; rather, as he writes in his “Self-Portrait,” the “*difference of perspective* is fundamental, infecting the intuitions with which all theorizing must begin, and it is thus the source of some of the deepest and most persistent disagreements in the field”.²⁴ After his first book set out this “renegade” view, his next two major monographs reinforced its centrality, with *The Intentional Stance* devoted to content, and *Consciousness Explained* obviously to consciousness.

As Dennett’s very thorough explorations of these two major topics in the philosophy of mind evolved from academically-oriented works published by scholarly, then into works for a broader (but still very serious) audience published by trade presses, so have his philosophical topics broadened. His two most recent major monographs (in a bibliography studded not only with several hundred essays, but also with several collections

²² Daniel Clement Dennett, *Brainchildren: Essays on Designing Minds (Representation and Mind)* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1998), 354.

²³ “Intuition pumps are powerful pedagogical devices. Descartes’ ‘*cogito ergo sum*’ thought experiment is generally agreed to be logically suspect, if not downright defective. It has inspired literally dozens of reinterpretations and defenses; many philosophy professors would dismiss all these commentaries while never dreaming of removing Descartes’ dramatic idea from the syllabus. Even great intuition pumps can mislead as much as they instruct” See, Daniel Clement Dennett, *Elbow Room* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), 18.

²⁴ Daniel Clement Dennett, *Op.Cit.*

thereof) may seem like departures from the philosophy of mind world: the first, *Darwin's Dangerous Idea*, was (ostensibly) about biology, and the second, *Breaking the Spell*, (also ostensibly) about theology.

But of course, Dennett gives no cause for one to accuse him of gross multiplicity of purpose. Although each of these books is a remarkably engaging, deep and thoughtful account of its principal topic; Dennett writes them without the pretense of any expertise other than his own. Of *Darwin's Dangerous Idea* he writes, "This book is largely about science but is not itself a work of science"²⁵ and of *Breaking the Spell* he writes, "I am a philosopher, not a biologist or an anthropologist or a sociologist or historian or theologian. We philosophers are better at asking questions than at answering them, and this may strike some people as a comical admission of futility"²⁶. These are not admissions of (false) modesty, and neither are they attempts to deflect criticism by claiming amateur status. They are, rather up-front epistemological and methodological statements, and as such bold defenses of Dennett's qualifications to write outside his field.

This boldness and openness are characteristic of Dennett's style of composition and argumentation, which is a no-nonsense affair. That is not at all to say that he is humorless or fun-free! On the contrary, in addition to his earlier forays into philosophical science fiction and film, his mature writings (somewhat more serious) are still spiced with "Quinian crossword puzzles" (simple crosswords with two equally good solutions, named after Dennett's Harvard teacher, the philosopher Willard Van Orman Quine) and his colleague, named tools like "*intuition pumps*" (a sort of thought experiment) designed to

²⁵ Daniel Clement Dennett, *Darwin's Dangerous Idea: Evolution and The Meanings of Life* (London: Penguin Group, 1995), 11.

²⁶ Daniel Clement Dennett, *Breaking the Spell: Religion as a Natural Phenomenon* (London: Penguin Group, 2006), 19.

elicit intuitive, responses and wonderful frequently based on the name of some other philosopher.

Dennett's rich metaphors, whether they are based on personal references or subtle demarcations among philosophical ideas, are always both very precise and remarkably memorable. For example his term "greedy reductionism." On the one hand, he surely understands that he is going against the flow of common usage by claiming a positive connotation for the philosophically neutral term "reductionism"; on the other hand, he also understands precisely *why* "reductionism" might be understood negatively by non-philosophers, so he attaches the clearly negative attribute "greedy" to *that* kind of "reductionism." *How* does he do this? He begins with two of his central metaphors for the (also metaphorical) *building* of an explanation for some natural phenomenon, the crane and the skyhook:

Cranes can do the lifting work our imaginary skyhooks might do, and they do it in an honest, non-question-begging fashion. They are expensive, however. They have to be designed and built, from everyday parts already on hand, and they have to be located on a firm base of existing ground. Skyhooks are miraculous lifters, unsupported and insupportable. Cranes are no less excellent as lifters, and they have the decided advantage of being real.²⁷

With these two potential tools in his explanatory kit, Dennett uses the obviously *negative metaphor* to illustrate the negative sense of the term, and the obviously positive one for the positive sense: "We must distinguish reductionism, which is in general a good thing, from *greedy reductionism*, which is not. The difference—in the context of Darwin's theory—is simple: *greedy* reductionists think that everything can be explained without cranes; good reductionists think that everything can be explained without skyhooks".²⁸ So what it means to call Dennett's style of argumentation "no-nonsense" is that he takes the

²⁷ Daniel Clement Dennett, *Op.Cit.*, 75.

²⁸ ²⁸ Daniel Clement Dennett, *Darwin's Dangerous Idea: Evolution and The Meanings of Life* (London: Penguin Group, 1995), 81-82.

utmost care to bring his readers along with him as he embarks on his complex journeys of discovery. Continuing with the architectural metaphor: Dennett's works are complex structures in which he anticipates the possible objections of interlocutors both real and imaginary, *methodically builds* his arguments from their foundational questions, carefully places the load-bearing beams of experiment and sculpts his conclusions all the way up to the pinnacles of their most unexpected implications. But let us examine another of Dennett's own explanatory metaphors for his own work (is this a "meta-metaphor?"); of his central thesis in *Consciousness Explained* he writes, "This is still not an easy idea to understand, let alone accept. We must build several more roads to it".²⁹ This conscious, conscientious and device-baring technique—building multiple roads toward a *difficult idea*—manifests itself in explicitly reader-friendly compositions. *Breaking the Spell*, *Darwin's Dangerous Idea* and *Freedom Evolves*, for example; all have this curious structural trait: each chapter break is bridged by a one-paragraph summary of the chapter, its leading the reader carefully through what is bound to be a complex argument. Rather, he noted:

The questions *are* important—indeed, crucial to my whole project—since they put into doubt the very possibility of conducting the inquiry I am embarking on, but they *can* be postponed until after the theory sketch is completed. If you disagree, then before continuing with chapter 4 you should turn directly to appendix B, "Some More Questions About Science," which deals with these questions, spelling out in more detail, and defending, the path by which we can work together to find mutual agreement about how to proceed and what matters.³⁰

Consciousness Explained comes equipped with two appendices, "A (for Philosophers)" and "B (for Scientists)." These back-of-the-book sections are not where you'd look, as in a high-school textbook, for the answers: they contain, rather, even deeper

²⁹ Daniel Clement Dennett, *Consciousness Explained* (New York: Back Bay Books, 1992), 170.

³⁰ Daniel Clement Dennett, *Breaking the Spell: Religion as a Natural Phenomenon* (London: Penguin Group, 2006), 93.

questions and discussion; they fill in some gaps; they suggest experiments that might prove or disprove Dennett's controversial hypotheses. Remarkably for the characteristically bold Dennett,³¹ those supplemental questions that he suggests and those problematic aspects of his thesis that he offers for experimental falsification, those aspects of his theories that he freely acknowledges as still unresolved, are the very embodiment of intellectual integrity and modesty. *Darwin's Dangerous Idea: Evolution and The Meanings of Life* is the "dangerous idea" it is Darwin's revolutionary alternative way to understand the teleological question—the *why* question—in algorithmic, mechanistic and materialistic ways. Dennett's contribution to the discussion of the biggest questions of the human condition (such as "free will", "content", "consciousness" and so forth) is his insistence careful reasoning: explaining these marvelous and difficult phenomena without miraculous notable ideas, are all the more remarkable for the explanatory work they do.

Based on the issues that have been presented, the author will use the theoretical framework of Dennett and describes about content and consciousness. Daniel C. Dennett as a main reference of this research, from his book entitled: *Intuition Pumps and Other Tools for Thinking*. The main premise of the book Dennett can be explained with some tools for thinking through the theory of 'Darwinian Evolution'. Dennett reveals the importance of content and consciousness through scientific observation and scientific investigation. One thing that needs to be underlined, that such an efforts to proof a human curiosity on thought processes of content and consciousness, and inquiry 'how' with several identification, indication and explanation; becomes a central point of discussion about content and consciousness in Dennett's thought and his works.

³¹ See, Andrew Brook and Don Ross quipped about Dennett's title *Consciousness Explained* that "modesty is a virtue to be kept for special occasions." *Daniel Dennett (Contemporary Philosophy in Focus)* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 8.

Occam's razor attributed to William of Ockham³² (or Occam), this thinking tool is actually much older rule. A Latin name for it is *lex parsimoniae*, the Law of parsimony. It is usually put into English as the maxim "do not multiply entities beyond necessity." One of the least impressive attempts to apply Occam's razor to a gnarly problem is the claim (and provoked counterclaims) that postulating God as creator of the universe is simpler, more parsimonious, than the alternatives. *How can postulating something supernatural and incomprehensible be Parsimonious?* The prospect of turning it into a metaphysical principle or fundamental requirement of rationality that can bear the weight of proving or disproving the existence of God in one fell swoop is simply ludicrous. It shall be like trying to disprove a theorem of quantum mechanics by showing that it contradicted the axiom "do not put all your eggs in one basket."

A *deepity* (a term coined by Joseph's daughter)³³ it is a proposition that seems both important, but that achieves this effect by being ambiguous. On another reading, it is manifestly false; on the other reading, it is true but trivial. The unwary listener picks up the glimmer of truth from the second reading, and the devastating importance from the first

³² William of Ockham ([/ˈɒkəm/](#); also Occam; c. 1287 - 1347) was an [English Franciscan friar](#) and [scholastic philosopher](#) and theologian, who is believed to have been born in [Ockham](#), a small village in [Surrey](#). He is considered to be one of the major figures of [medieval](#) thought and was at the centre of the major intellectual and political controversies of the fourteenth century. He is commonly known for [Occam's razor](#), the methodological principle that bears his name and also produced significant works on [logic](#), [physics](#) and [theology](#). In the [Church of England](#), his day of commemoration is 10 April. There are claims also that he was born in Ockham, Yorkshire but it is now accepted that his birth place was in Surrey. See Rega Wood, *Ockham on the Virtues* (Indiana: Purdue University Press, 1997) and see also, '[Holy Days](#)', *Liturgical Calendar*, Church of England, 1997.

³³ Joseph Weizenbaum (8 January 1923-5 March 2008) was a [German](#) and [American computer scientist](#) and a [professor emeritus](#) at [MIT](#). The [Weizenbaum Award](#) is named after him. Born in Berlin, Germany to [Jewish](#) parents, he escaped [Nazi Germany](#) in January 1936, immigrating with his family to the [United States](#). He started studying mathematics in 1941 in the U.S., but his studies were interrupted by the war, during which he served in the military. See, "Joseph Weizenbaum" [Wikipedia](#). (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joseph_Weizenbaum., accessed on December, 26 2013)

reading. Here is an example: “love is just a word.” Wrong, on one reading, it is manifestly false; so what love is—maybe an emotional attachment or the highest state a human mind can achieve— but we all know, that love is not only a word.

1.6 Method of Research

1.6.1 Method and Approach of Research

The method that will be used here is a *descriptive-analytic*, its to explain Dennett’s thought on content and consciousness. The approach that will be used in this thesis is *textual analytic approach* by Dr. Klaus H. Krippendorff on his book *Content Analysis: An Introduction to Its Methodology*,³⁴ which is a methodology employing a technique of open analysis. Its identifies the dominant messages and subject matter within the text. Hence, the thesis will be focusing only on the written text.

1.6.2 Source of Data

The source of data consists of primary data and secondary data. The primary data particularly consists by Dennett’s works, and the secondary data consists by some philosopher, scientist and scholar are closely related to content and consciousness in Dennett’s Thought; and some articles, sites, blogs and other resources about the topic.

1.6.3 Technique of Collecting Data

The thesis is *qualitative*³⁵ library research in data collecting-called ‘technique of citation’ which is a part of ‘bibliographical technique/research’-which involves identifying

³⁴ See, Klaus H. Krippendorff, *Content Analysis: an Introduction to its Methodology* (Sage Publications: California, 2004).

³⁵ Qualitative designates any research whose results are captured in words, images, or nonnumeric symbols; for instance, research on dreams. Quantitative describes any approach where the phenomena under study is captured via measurement and expressed in numbers that can be analyzed; opposite of qualitative research; econometric research on the international oil trade is an example, See, Mary W. George, *The Element of Library Research: What Every Student Need to Know* (London: Princeton University Press, 2008), 7.

and locating sources that provide factual information or personal/expert opinion on research question; necessary component of every other research method at some point.³⁶

1.6.4 Analysis of Data

To analysis the data that has been collected before, first of all that have to be done is classifying and categorizing the data which can be categorize into two; primary data and secondary data.



³⁶ *Ibid.*, 6.